This book reflects on how narrow social and political elite structures of a society induce bad governance and sub-optimal public policies. Numerous important questions are raised for their possible answers from the political economy perspective. Why do we see poor governance and elitist policies in democracies of the Third World despite principle of one man, one vote? How do rent-seeking and culture of patronage perpetuate bad governance? How governance trap is created due to elitist structures and policies and why is such trap responsible for poverty? How do bad governance structures serve the interests of the elite at the expense of masses? Why is non-farm rural economy neglected at public policy level? Why does corruption persist despite all rhetoric against it? Why cannot we raise due taxes? Why are IMF prescriptions bad for long-term economic growth? etc. The book provides students and researchers a rich menu of issues and topics for further research in the areas of political economy, governance, corruption, and taxation. It is written in a captivating style and brings together insights from multiple academic papers and reports.